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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
The Ordinary Diet of the Law: 
How to Interpret Public Law 86-272
by Darien Shanske and David Gamage
Indeed, in today’s world, filled with legal 
complexity, the true test of federalist 
principle may lie, not in the occasional 
constitutional effort to trim Congress’ 
commerce power at its edges, or to 
protect a State’s treasury from a private 
damages action, but rather in those many 
statutory cases where courts interpret the 
mass of technical detail that is the 
ordinary diet of the law.1
Public Law 86-272 is an important feature of 
the landscape of both state corporate income 
taxation and state tax policy more generally.2 The 
Multistate Tax Commission is completing an 
important project on updating the guidance 
given to taxpayers regarding compliance with 
P.L. 86-272.3 We plan to discuss some key 
features of this planned guidance in a future 
article (or perhaps articles). But first we will 
discuss the overall interpretive rubric that 
should be used for P.L. 86-272.
I. Some Quick Background
P.L. 86-272 protects taxpayers from state 
income taxation if certain criteria are met.4 Those 
criteria include not having an office in the state 
and only selling tangible personal property. For 
purposes of the MTC project, the most important 
criterion is that a taxpayer is protected if it 
engages only in “solicitation” in the state.
However, the statute itself offers little direct 
guidance on what solicitation means. Nor is 
such guidance to be found in the legislative 
history. This has long been recognized as an 
important problem.5
Darien Shanske is a professor at the 
University of California, Davis, School of Law 
(King Hall), and David Gamage is a professor of 
law at Indiana University Maurer School of 
Law.
In this installment of Academic Perspectives 
on SALT, the authors argue that a proper, fair 
reading of Public Law 86-272 should not 
involve expanding its coverage to protect 
business practices that differ from the practices 
that Congress specifically intended to protect at 
the time of the statute’s enactment.
1
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 160-61 (2001) (Breyer, J. dissenting) 
(internal citations omitted).
2
Just how important a feature is, in fact, a hard question to answer. 
See Dan R. Bucks et al., “Public Law 86-272: Still Bad Policy After 60 
Years,” Tax Notes State, Oct. 7, 2019, p. 13, 16-18. For a fuller discussion — 
and critique — of P.L. 86-272, see Michael T. Fatale, “Federalism and 
State Business Activity Tax Nexus: Revisiting Public Law 86-272,” 21 Va. 
Tax Rev. 435 (2002).
3
Multistate Tax Commission, “P.L. 86-272 Statement of Information 
Work Group.”
4
15 U.S.C. section 381.
5
See, e.g., Paul J. Hartman, “State Taxation of Corporate Income From 
a Multistate Business,” 13 Vand. L. Rev. 21, 47 (1959).
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Today, the primary source of authority for 
interpreting solicitation is the 1992 Supreme 
Court opinion in Wrigley6 written by Justice 
Antonin Scalia. In that opinion, Scalia largely 
eschewed legislative history and instead started 
with a dictionary “to ascertain the fair meaning” 
of solicitation.7
Specifically, Scalia found that solicitation 
encompassed “those activities that are entirely 
ancillary to requests for purchases — those that 
serve no independent business function apart 
from their connection to the soliciting of orders — 
[in contrast to] those activities that the company 
would have reason to engage in anyway but 
chooses to allocate to its in-state sales force.”8 
Scalia illustrated the distinction by way of 
examples, explaining that “employing salesmen 
to repair or service the company’s products is not 
part of the ‘solicitation of orders,’ since there is 
good reason to get that done whether or not the 
company has a sales force.”9
Yet now, in 2020, some repairs can be done 
over the internet. Should this change in 
technology mean that such in-state services do not 
go beyond solicitation?10 The result of such an 
interpretation would be to let technological 
advancements effectively expand the scope of 
“solicitation” and create an ever larger “tax free” 
zone. The MTC guidelines are premised on the 
notion that this is not the correct way to interpret 
the law. Accordingly, one of the proposed 
guidelines explains that if “the business regularly 
provides post-sale assistance to in-state customers 
(i.e., advice on how to use a product after the 
product has been delivered to the customer) via 
either electronic chat or email that customers 
initiate by clicking on an icon on the business’s 
website,” then the business loses the protection of 
P.L. 86-272.11
II. A Matter of Interpretation
There is another way of looking at matters, of 
course. We just characterized the MTC approach 
as not letting technology expand the concept of 
solicitation. Others take the perspective that the 
MTC approach is narrowing the legitimate reach 
of P.L. 86-272.12 No doubt there can be arguments 
in specific cases about what constitutes 
solicitation, but we see this counterargument as 
primarily a legislative intent or purpose-based 
argument. The argument has some appeal. 
Congress meant to set up a minimum standard of 
nexus with P.L. 86-272 and narrowing the 
definition of “solicitation” would seem to 
puncture this minimum.
However, this surface appeal disappears upon 
closer inspection. This is for reasons that we will 
now explain.
First, Congress did not, in fact, write a statute 
that imposed a minimum standard. Rather, 
Congress wrote a statute that created a minimum 
through a set of rules. That is, Congress passed 
specific protections — protections that traced 
then-current business practices that had come to 
Congress’s attention through court cases.13 
Indeed, the statute Congress passed would not 
even protect the taxpayer at issue in the main 
Supreme Court decision that precipitated the 
6









This is also why the word “within” in P.L. 86-272 cannot bear the 
interpretive weight that some commentators place upon it. See Martin I. 
Eisenstein and David W. Bertoni, “Wayfair Misused: States and Cities 
Seek to Expand Their Tax Powers,” Tax Notes State, Dec. 16, 2019, p. 891, 
896-97. To be sure, the nonprotected activities must occur within the 
state, but when, for example, an item is repaired in the state by means of 
the internet there is a powerful argument that that activity is in the state.
11
MTC, “Statement of Information Concerning Practices of Multistate 
Tax Commission and Signatory States Under Public Law 86-272,” 
Example 2 (Feb. 14, 2020).
12
See presentation by Philip Tatarowicz linked to in Amy Hamilton, 
“Tatarowicz Sharply Critical of MTC Project on P.L. 86-272,” Tax Notes 
State, Dec. 23, 2019, p. 1190, at slide 44 (“From an income tax nexus 
perspective, if the tools of efficiency created by E-Commerce are 
weaponized by States going wild to expand their tax reach, P.L. 86-272 
will be emasculated; thus, turning away from Congressional intent.”); 
Christopher T. Lutz, “What to Do With Public Law 86-272,” Tax Notes 
State, Dec. 23, 2019, p. 1071, 1072 (“I’m not so sure the MTC’s Uniformity 
Committee is really geared to faithfully construe the text and purpose of 
P.L. 86-272”); David W. Bertoni, David Swetnam-Burland, and Jamie 
Szal, “Crossfire Hurricane: Perils in a Post-Wayfair World,” Tax Notes 
State, Mar. 16, 2020, p. 937, 942 (“Under the mantra of bringing P.L. 86-
272 into the modern era, the working group of the MTC has lost sight of 
the fundamental purpose of this federal statute and the protection it 
provides.”).
13
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 86-936 at 1 (1959). The three cases are: 
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 454 
(1959); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 234 La. 651 
(1958); International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 236 La. 279 (1958).
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whole crisis — Northwestern Portland. This is 
because a taxpayer loses the protection of P.L. 86-
272 if it maintains an office in the state, and the 
taxpayer in Northwestern Portland had an office in 
the taxing state.
The version of the bill referred out of the 
Senate Finance Committee did protect businesses 
with an office in state if they just engaged in 
solicitation,14 and would have covered the 
Northwestern Portland fact pattern. Yet the bill was 
amended on the Senate floor and, by a vote of 65-
29, this provision was eliminated.15 Given that 
Congress pared the law back not even to cover the 
three central business scenarios before it, but 
rather only two, it is non-persuasive to argue that 
Congress intended the bill to protect further 
business patterns then completely unimaginable.
Second, a corollary of this point is that it is 
generally not proper statutory interpretation to 
argue that Congress’s intent to protect specific 
business patterns should apply to other arguably 
similar business patterns, just because doing 
otherwise would make the statute less relevant to 
modern circumstances. For instance, imagine that 
Congress passed a law to protect buggy whip 
manufacturers and never repealed that law. 
Would that mean that there is now an 
interpretative imperative to protect other 
transportation-related manufacturers? No!16 The 
goal of protecting buggy whip manufacturers 
might well have been motivated by special 
interest concerns of the time or a desire to slow the 
transitionary displacement caused by 
technological changes (like the spread of 
automobiles). Put another way, just because 
Congress passed a statute 60 years ago with two 
fact patterns in mind, and with the language of 
the statute reflecting concerns related to those two 
fact patterns, in no way implies that the statute 
was meant to serve a broader purpose. If those 
fact patterns are far less important today, then it 
should be up to Congress to decide how to update 
the statute or whether to do so at all.
Third, the legislative history indicates that 
Congress did not intend P.L. 86-272’s protections 
to extend to near substitutes of the specific forms 
of business explicitly protected, including a case 
rather analogous to the ones we are now 
considering. That is, in its report on P.L. 86-272, 
the Willis Committee explained that it did not 
consider that “Operation of mobile stores in the 
State” was an activity that was intended to be 
protected by the statute.17 To be sure, the Willis 
Committee report postdates the enactment of P.L. 
86-272, but it is fairly close in time and the whole 
point of this section of the report was to consider 
whether Congress should retain P.L. 86-272.18 A 
mobile store in the state would seem to be a fair 
1960s description of what the modern internet 
effectively enables.
Fourth, the problem Congress aimed to 
legislate against with P.L. 86-272 has mostly gone 
away with time, which further weighs against a 
sweeping interpretation of the statute. Congress 
legislated P.L. 86-272 out of fear that the Supreme 
Court might not set an appropriate minimum for 
nexus.19 Today, that fear is unfounded. In fact, the 
protections offered by current constitutional 
jurisprudence are often greater than those offered 
by P.L. 86-272. Most obviously, this is because the 
constitutional “substantial nexus” standard 
protects all taxpayers, even sellers of services, 
from all taxes.
But even as to just the income tax the 
constitutional standard will often be higher. A 
relatively small taxpayer can lose the P.L. 86-272 
protection for minor in-state activities, such as 
engaging in $10,000 in sales that are not fulfilled 
out of state. This level of nexus is probably not 
14
S. Rep. No. 86-658 at 6 (1959).
15
105 Cong. Rec. 16470, 16477 (1959).
16
And so, at least as to P.L. 86-272, we agree with Bertoni et al. that 
“the words of a tax statute enacted in the 1950s must have the meaning 
that was intended when it was enacted, and not be given some gloss that 
rests on a radically different economy and modalities of commerce that 
came into existence many decades later.” Bertoni, Swetnam-Burland, 
and Szal, supra note 12, at 943. Perplexingly, the authors claim that this 
argument indicates that there is something amiss in the MTC’s project. 
This is apparently because of their overreading of the word “within.” See 
supra note 10. Again, we argue that extending solicitation to include 
interactive websites is to give an old statute a radical new gloss and not 
the reverse.
17
H. Rep. No. 88-1480 at 427 (1964).
18
Treating this report as part of P.L. 86-272’s legislative history is 
quite common. See, for example, Tatarowicz, supra note 12, slide 53.
19
See, e.g., S. Rep. 86-658 at 4; and H. Rep. No. 88-1480 at 438.
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going to qualify as substantial under Wayfair. 
Moreover, many states have bright-line factor 
standards that are comfortably above the 
constitutional minimum.20
Further, the Court in Wayfair made clear that 
Pike balancing21 applies on top of the substantial 
nexus test.22 Thus, a taxpayer confronting a 
particularly onerous state tax regime today has 
another available remedy. And because Pike 
balancing is a balancing test, burdens that loom 
larger for smaller businesses will be harder to 
justify. With the mischief Congress tried to solve 
through P.L. 86-272 thus largely resolved by 
subsequent judicial decisions, purpose-based 
arguments for expanding P.L. 86-272 have little 
analytic purchase.
We think that this is the primary significance 
of Wayfair as to P.L. 86-272. But Wayfair is also 
relevant in that not one member of the Court in 
Wayfair had anything nice to say about the formal, 
physical presence test from Quill.23 Indeed, the 
majority, in a key passage, discussed the 
importance of “virtual contacts” in potentially 
creating nexus in the modern economy.24 The 
dissent did not dispute this so much as argue that 
the great increase in e-commerce indicates that 
the Court should not intercede because of the 
unpredictable result of fixing its error. Note that 
from our perspective, “modernizing” P.L. 86-272 
so it would exempt new forms of commerce 
would be to repeat the sins of Quill and, also, of 
Wayfair as understood by the dissent.25
Fifth, a fundamental ground rule in our 
constitutional system is that preemptions of 
traditional state powers should be construed 
narrowly.26 It is true that much of the development 
of this doctrine postdates P.L. 86-272 (not that this 
has stopped the Court from applying it to earlier 
statutes), but there was definitely precedent to 
this effect before 1959.27 A canon is only an 
interpretive guide that can make more or less 
sense to apply in a given context. Yet here we 
would argue this canon is particularly apt because 
it correctly addresses a deep structural issue 
underlying our federal system.28 Through the lens 
of this canon, Congress should be understood as 
having made a limited incursion into state taxing 
power with P.L. 86-272, to solve a then-current 
problem. The alternative view has Congress 
creating a shelter from state taxation limited only 
by the ingenuity of tax lawyers to analogize 
current business models to the ones before 
Congress in 1959. It is useful to remember here 
that Congress could have, but did not, pass a 
broad nexus standard and thus that this canon is 
consonant with the text of the statute.
Note that our argument relying on the canon 
against preemption here is, in a sense, subtle. In 
20
It is thus wholly appropriate for new guidance from the MTC to 
include its model factor presence standard as an addendum. Brian 
Hamer of the MTC makes the same point. See Hamilton, “Factor 
Presence Nexus Thresholds Way to Protect Small Sellers,” Tax Notes 
State, Mar. 16, 2020, p. 992.
21
Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
22
South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 
(2018). For further discussion, see Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske, 
and David Gamage, “Wayfair: Substantial Nexus and Undue Burden,” 
State Tax Notes, July 30, 2018, p. 447.
23
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
24
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2095 (“A virtual showroom can show far more 
inventory, in far more detail, and with greater opportunities for 
consumer and seller interaction than might be possible for local stores. 
Yet the continuous and pervasive virtual presence of retailers today is, 
under Quill, simply irrelevant. This Court should not maintain a rule 
that ignores these substantial virtual connections to the State.”).
25
Id. at 2104 (“The Court is of course correct that the Nation’s 
economy has changed dramatically since the time that Bellas Hess and 
Quill roamed the earth. I fear the Court today is compounding its past 
error by trying to fix it in a totally different era.”) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting).
26
See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“We 
start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States 
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear 
and manifest purpose of Congress.”). See also California State Board of 
Equalization v. Sierra Summit Inc., 490 U.S. 844, 851-52 (1989) (“Although 
Congress can confer an immunity from state taxation, we have stated 
that [a] court must proceed carefully when asked to recognize an 
exemption from state taxation that Congress has not clearly expressed.”) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Florida 
Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 48, 50 (2008) 
(following Sierra Summit). For further discussion, see Shanske, “States 
Can and Should Respond Strategically to Federal Tax Law,” 45 Ohio N.U. 
L. Rev. 543 (2019).
27
It is also true that the canon has not been applied consistently, but 
that does not mean that it should not be. For a persuasive argument to 
this effect, see Ernest A. Young, “‘The Ordinary Diet of the Law’: The 
Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court,” 2011(1) Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 253, 344 (Jan. 2012) (“The presumption against preemption may be 
the last best hope for preserving a meaningful measure of state 
autonomy in our constitutional system.”).
28
Following Llewellyn, the key to applying a canon correctly is 
“situation sense.” Karl Llewellyn, “Remarks on the Theory of Appellate 
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be 
Construed,” 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 401 (1950).
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Heublein, the Supreme Court’s first P.L. 86-272 
case, this presumption was used to avoid an 
expansive interpretation of P.L. 86-272.29 In 
Wrigley, the states argued that this same 
presumption should lead to solicitation being 
interpreted narrowly. Scalia rejected that 
argument because, as to solicitation, Congress did 
clearly intend to preempt the states and so what 
was required was only a fair interpretation of 
what Congress actually wrote. But the situation 
before us today is more like Heublein than Wrigley. 
This is because at least some of the activities that 
taxpayers engage in through their websites are 
plainly more than entirely ancillary to solicitation 
and have been understood to be such since well 
before Wrigley. Thus, the critics of updating the 
guidelines are, as in Heublein, arguing for an 
extension of the protection offered by P.L. 86-272.
III. Conclusion
None of the foregoing necessarily supports 
the details of the MTC’s approach. We will thus 
return to analyzing those details in a future article 
or articles. Our goal here has been to clear away 
the interpretive underbrush. P.L. 86-272 is a 
poorly drafted, 60-year-old statute that 
specifically protects 60-year-old business 
practices. Consequently, we have argued here that 
a proper, fair reading of the statute should not 
involve expanding its coverage to protect current 
business practices that differ from those Congress 
specifically meant to protect when enacting P.L. 
86-272. 
29
Heublein Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 409 U.S. 275, 281-82 
(1972).
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